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The issue of politicisation of the public service has been of considerable interest in a number 
of countries over recent years as governments have sought to exercise greater direct control 
over the executive wing in order to insure effective and rapid implementation of their policy 
changes (ABC, 2002; Colley, 2001; Pullin & Haidar, 2003; Spry, 2001). Although such 
concerns can be readily evidenced in writings going back more than a century (Lord Morley, 
1889), in Australia there has been an increased academic and societal interest in the matter 
over the past twenty years in response both to government appointments and replacements 
of senior public servants, as well as a number of high profile crises in which an independent 
public service voice appeared absent (Emy & Hughes, 1988; Hawkes, 1999: 80; Henderson, 
1986:33; Mulgan, 1998a: 3; Nethercote, 2003; Parker & Nethercote, 1996; Podger, 2004:9- 
10; Weller, 1989: 369). 
 
However, despite this growing interest, ‘politicisation’ remains a very imprecise term (Parker, 
1989b:384-5). Public servants have been regarded as politicised because they themselves 
are politically aligned or their actions are seen to be political. Such observations do not assist 
in developing a useful understanding of whether a public service is or is not politicised 
(Weller, 1989). Public servants can be no more immune from ‘being political’ than any other 
person who holds views and votes. Similarly, public servants in implementing the policies of 
a government must also be seen to inevitably act politically. Often it is the appointment of 
persons to senior public service positions on the alleged basis of their political views or 
affiliations, or their removal, which is seen to be the source of a politicisation. This view is 
also problematic in terms of developing a definition of politicisation that might be tested 
empirically. Politicians should be able to expect that their senior public servants will act 
diligently to implement government policies and it is not useful to regard them as politicised 
because they do so. Nor is it thought constructive to regard the appointment of an individual 
with particular political views as necessarily constituting a politicised appointment, as the 
decision may have been based upon other criteria. 
 
The issue of public service politicisation has been a focus of attention because it is seen to 
impact upon the quality of government and democracy in those countries that have adopted a 
Westminster style of government. Even in the United States of America (USA), which has 
not, such concerns are apparent (Peters, 1995:91). Yet, a precise definition of a politicised 
(Vis a Vis non-politicised) public service remains elusive. The purpose of this paper is to 
present a model that may assist in advancing the inquiry. When Northcote and Trevelyan 
issued their Report on the Organisation of the Permanent Civil Service in 1854, they placed 
the employment relationship of public servants at the core of their model, known as the 
Westminster system (1854). Indeed, what public servants do, whether they act for party 
purposes, can be seen within the Northcote-Trevelyan model to be secondary to the nature 
of their employment relationship. The Northcote-Trevelyan specifications for an independent 
civil service provide the basis for a model of a non-politicised public service. 
 A theoretical framework for analysing the relationship between public policy in Australia and 
politicisation of the employment relationship (ERp) is first presented, based upon relevant 
literature. The ERp is seen to be a control relationship in which such control is exercised 
through human resource management (HRM) functions, all of which were essentially 
addressed in the Northcote and Trevelyan Report (1854). Weberian style ‘ideal types’ 
(Weber, 1968:20-1) are developed which contrast the ‘rational, independent, non-politicised’ 
with the ‘irrational politicised’ forms of the ERp. Each of these ‘ideal types’ consists of 
exhaustive and mutually exclusive dimensions (Kitay & Marchington, 1996:1265,78,87). They 
are not meant to mirror reality but rather to provide analytical tools (Weber, 1968:21). Their 
usefulness is explored through two case studies: the appointment of one Department 
Secretary and the termination of another. 
 
Politicisation of the Employment Relationship 
In order to develop an understanding of a ‘politicised’ ERp, consideration will be first given to 
defining the relationship itself and then to the meaning of ‘politicisation’ of that relationship 
within the context of public sector employment. 
 
Defining the Employment Relationship 
The origins of the law defining the ERp in Australia are to be found in English law which was 
itself influenced by the Roman (Macken, O'Grady, Sappideen, & Warburton, 2002:1-2). For 
workers, the transition from a feudal to an industrial society was evolutionary and “it was 
logical that the courts would apply the rules of contract law to the relationship” (Macken et al., 
2002:6).  The courts determined that the degree of control exercised in the relationship by 
the person employing, the amount, nature and direction of that control distinguished the 
employment contract from other relationships (Macken et al., 2002:7) Thus the ‘control test’ 
came to determine the existence (or not) of an ERp and, in legal terms, its existence was 
seen to be dependent upon whether or not a contract of service existed. In recognition of the 
difficulties associated with determining the existence of an ERp, the courts have developed 
an extended control test to assess ‘whether on balance, the range of features or indicia of 
the working relationship are more in the nature of an employer/employee relationship or 
otherwise’ (Clayton & Mitchel, 1999:22). The ‘control test’ ‘has to be applied to the reality and 
the totality of the relationship between the two persons- and not to the work itself’ (Macken et 
al., 2002:8). 
 
Control of the ERp is also a common focus of industrial relations (IR), human resource 
management (HRM) and employment relations (ER) approaches. Fastenau and Pullin (1998) 
argue that the IR perspective focuses upon workers’ efforts to control the ERp and the 
employer response, while HRM focuses on management’s efforts to direct and control the 
relationship.  Keenoy and Kelly (1998) view the nature of work and its power relations as the 
fundamental focus of their study of the ERp and argue that  industrial relations institutions 
and changes can be best understood in terms of three great struggles for the control of the 
workplace: the distribution of rewards, the limits of managerial autonomy, and the difficulties 
in securing employee commitment (Keenoy & Kelly, 1998). 
 
The sources of power and authority in the ERp are many but may be classified according to 
the dimensions of the relationship identified in the literature, namely, the economic, legal, 
social, psychological and political (Spooner & Haidar, 2005a). Control is exercised through a 
range of practices and behaviours including formal and informal rules and regulations, 
strategies and sanctions. Fells (1989:480-1) cautions that control can be achieved by actions 
that do not necessarily have the appearance of controlling activities such as through the 
introduction of particular practices including even those of a participative nature. Whilst 
control in the ERp may be contested, legally and economically, the balance of power rests 
with the employer. 
 
While it is apparent that control is exercised and resisted within all aspects of the ERp, a 
distinction must be made between the relationship itself and its intended outcomes or the 
 work performed. Behrend (1957:505) argues that within every ERp there are two main 
elements, an agreement on wages and an agreement on the work to be done. This domain 
of activity in which an ‘agreement’ is reached may be viewed as the HR domain. Beyond and 
somewhat separate to this area of activity, however, lays the domain of work itself. Haidar 
and Pullin (2001:645) offer the notion of there being two areas in which power is exercised in 
the ERp, which they term the task and HR domains. The task domain includes the actual 
performance of the job in which the worker is seen to be under the command of a super 
ordinate (Haidar & Pullin, 2001:644-6). The HR domain includes ‘the span of control over HR 
functions’ such as recruitment, compensation, development, promotion and dismissal (Haidar 
& Pullin, 2001:645-6).. 
 
Control by the employer is exercised over the relationship primarily through the HRM function. 
Although control over the performance of specific tasks and job functions may be exercised, 
control over the relationship is ultimately actioned within the HR domain. While effective 
organisations may well demonstrate a strong inter-relationship between their control of both 
task and HR domains, these remain conceptually and in  many cases, practically quite 
separate. A worker who fails in the assigned tasks may still be promoted, while one who 
exceeds the job requirements can nevertheless face retrenchment. The power to control job 
performance (or task elements) derives from the power to control the HRM elements of the 
ERp. 
 
A study of the exercise of control by an employer over an employee must be focussed upon 
the HRM domain of that relationship and the way control is actioned through the various 
HRM practices. Taxonomies of HRM functions are widely available within the literature and 
recited in almost every contemporary HR text as well as numerous journal articles (De Cieri 
& Kramar, 2003; Dessler, Griffiths, & Lloyd-Walker, 2004; Devanna, Fombrun, & Tichy, 1981; 
Gardner, 1993; Pynes, 1998). Bobko and Russell (1991) analyse the use of taxonomies in 
HRM and identify that they are attempts at classification but note that as there is no 
overarching definition of HRM, those taxonomies that have been developed reflect the 
purpose for which they were proposed. Bobko and Russell (1991) identify and examine the 
categories of job analysis, selection as well as  training and development. A great deal of 
contemporary HRM literature focuses upon the strategic planning function and/or HR 
information systems as important HRM functions (Pynes, 1998). These examples highlight 
the need to distinguish between HRM functions which are essentially managerial (such as 
planning and information processing) and those that directly impact upon the ERp itself. 
From a review of the literature it can be seen that the key functions impacting upon the ERp 
are the acquisition (recruitment and selection), reward and motivation (compensation), 
development (training and development), maintenance (performance management) and 
separation (termination and retirement) activities of HRM (De Cieri & Kramar, 2003; 
Nankervis, Compton, & Baird, 2002; Stone, 2005:10). 
 
The HRM functions directly impacting upon the ERp are the mechanisms of employer control 
over the relationship and provide the basis for an analysis of whether this is politicised. To re- 
encapsulate the argument advanced so far: the ERp is a control relationship in which the 
employer  exercises  superior  power  to  control;  although  the  relationship  witnesses  the 
exercise of control through both task and HRM domains, it is within the latter that ultimate 
control is actioned; and, it is through the performance of specific HRM functions that control 
is executed. 
 
Politicisation of the Public Sector Employment Relationship 
Since the introduction of the modern public service in the mid nineteenth century, concerted 
effort has been made to keep politicians out of public management and legal provisions have 
been introduced to prevent interference of politicians in the employment aspects of public 
managers and also from the detailed implementation of public policies (Spooner & Haidar, 
2005b). One purpose of the introduction of this arrangement was to get rid of the problems 
associated  with  the  patronage  system,  which  many  claimed  lead  to  inefficiency  and 
 ineffective use of public money (Farnham & Horton, 1996:50-1; Spooner & Haidar, 2005c:44; 
Spry, 2000:5). A politicisation of public employment restricts the opportunity for citizens to 
work in government by limiting such access to those who are liked by politicians and, this in 
turn, may deprive the nation of the use of technical expertise existing within a country (Stahl, 
1971:29). 
 
Politicisation means different things to different people. Politicisation in the context of the 
public service tends to have a variety of meanings and there is a tendency to regard all 
political activities of public servants as part of a politicisation process (Curnow, 1989: 17-21; 
Haidar & Pullin, 2004: 1-3; Mulgan, 1998a:3; Parker, 1989a:384-5; Weller, 1989:369-70). 
Weller argues that politicisation is to be seen as the opposite of political neutrality and 
identifies politicisation with two tendencies which can be said to contradict two aspects of 
neutrality: the use of the public service for party purposes and the appointment, promotion 
and tenure of public servants through party political influence (Weller, 1989). Indeed, Weller 
asserts that partisan appointments are at the core of charges of politicisation (1989:374). He 
argues that politicisation of the public service does not occur when public servants express 
their opinion or even when they take political action as part of their trade union activity nor is 
politicisation simply the reverse of neutrality (1989:370-1). It is argued that public servants 
have the right to be politically active as long as their personal preferences do not overrule 
government  policy   or   jeopardise  the   impartiality  of   the   public  service  (1989:371). 
Politicisation, according to Weller, becomes possible when the public service is used for 
party purposes and where there is party political influence in the appointment and promotion 
of public servants (Weller, 1989:371). Thus, the two major forms of politicisation are seen to 
be, first, what public servants do and, secondly, the nature of their employment relationship. 
 
The Northcote-Trevelyan Report of 1854 also placed the employment relationship of public 
servants at the core of their model, known as the Westminister system (1854). The Report is 
generally recognised to mark the origins of the meritocratic Civil Service (Farnham & Horton, 
1996:47). Within the Northcote-Trevelyan model, what public servants do (task domain) can 
be seen to be secondary to the nature of their employment relationship (HRM domain). If the 
employment relationship is politicised and party faithfuls are appointed, or incumbents are 
rewarded for acting for the party, then what they do can be seen to flow from their 
employment relationship. Key aspects o the HRM of public servants lies at the heart of 
whether a public service is politicized or independent. Ministerial   responsibility forms a vital 
component of the principles underpinning the Westminster style of government adopted in 
the United Kingdom, Australia and elsewhere (Lord Morley, 1889; Marshall, 1989). Critical 
elements of the Westminster principles are that public servants should be politically neutral 
(Audit  Office  Of  NSW,  1998:s.6).  The  Westminster  style  of  representative  democracy 
requires that ministers are responsible because they are conferred with executive power. 
The power that public servants exercise emanates from this power conferred on ministers. 
Under the Westminster principles, public servants are expected to provide frank and fearless 
advice but to be politically neutral servants of their ministers and to implement the policies 
laid down.  A major recommendation of the Northcote-Trevelyan Report (1854) was to create 
an arrangement whereby politicians will gain frank and fearless advice from public servants 
whose employment relationship is not controlled by them but rather by an independent public 
service agency (Haidar & Pullin, 2004:12). Appointment on merit, security of tenure and a 
career service are complementary principles seen to support the neutrality of public servants 
and which epitomised the public service ERp in Australia and elsewhere for more than 150 
years. 
 
In drafting the Australian Constitution, attention was directed as to how persons should be 
appointed to the Commonwealth Public Service and as to ‘how best to guard against 
Their improper dismissal’ (Spry, 2000:2). The Constitution (1901:s.67) provides for the 
appointment of public servants and requires that the power to appoint and remove ‘shall be 
vested in the Governor-General in Council, unless the appointment is delegated by the 
Governor-General in Council or by a law of the Commonwealth to some other authority’. Spry 
 (Spry, 2000) provides an informative account of the development of legislation governing the 
ERp of public servants and argues that ‘an overriding concern of those who contributed to 
the debate over the (first) Public Service Bill was to ensure that political patronage played no 
part in appointments to, or promotions within, the Commonwealth Public Service’. The first 
relevant legislation was the Public Service Act 1902 (Cwlth) which provided for entry to the 
Service by 'open, competitive, and written examinations', appointments at a junior level with 
more senior positions closed to outside entrants’ (Report of the Committee of Inquiry into 
Public Service Recruitment, [Boyer Report], 1959; Spry, 2000:8). Since that time, there have 
been many amendments to the laws governing the terms of employment pertaining to public 
servants and to Departmental Heads (previously Permanent Heads) in particular. However, 
the nature of these changes may not have altered the basic principles underpinning the 
system until the 1970’s. 
 
It appears that growing dissatisfaction with the public service, partly related to perceived 
barriers to ministerial control, was not fully evident in Australia until the 1970’s (Spooner & 
Haidar, 2005c:47-9). A rapid expansion in government functions and a consequent growth in 
the Australian public service after World War II had resulted in a loss of ministerial control 
over the expanded range of administrative and policy matters, with power shifting to senior 
public servants or ‘mandarins’ (ABC, 2002; Pullin & Haidar, 2003; Weller & Smith, 1977:6; 
Wilenski, 1986:17). The election in 1972 of the first Australian Labour Party (ALP) 
government in twenty-three years, and one that was committed to a broad reform agenda, 
resulted in growing concern over issues of ministerial control and the political neutrality of 
public servants (Weller and Smith 1977:7). In 1974, the Prime Minister announced the 
establishment of a Royal Commission to examine government administration (RCAGA, 1976; 
Spooner & Haidar, 2005c). Since that time, there has been considerable change in the 
nature of public sector employment, including significant reforms to some aspects of the HRM 
of senior public servants. A comprehensive analysis of these changes is beyond the scope of 
this paper although the various legislative amendments have been outlined by Spry (2000) 
and others. The detail of these reforms is very lengthy but include the introduction of: a 
greater political role in the appointment and removal of departmental secretaries - no 
longer 'Permanent Heads’ (1984); provision of fixed term appointments for Departmental 
Secretaries (1993); provision for the Prime Minister to appoint (and terminate) a person to be 
the Secretary of a Department for a period of up to 5 years (1996); provision for the Prime 
Minister to appoint, terminate and determine remuneration of Secretaries of Departments 
(Public Service Act 1999:S.56-61). 
 
By 2006, it would appear that the Northcote-Trevelyan model of an independent public 
service is dead in terms of the ERp of very senior public servants in Australia, now known as 
‘Secretary of a Department’. It appears that appointment on merit, as assessed through 
some form of independent assessment of qualifications, the notion of belonging to a ‘career 
service’ and tenure are no longer applicable in the ERp of Departmental Secretaries. The 
current legislative provisions appear to provide for the Prime Minister to employ and 
terminate these leading, key personnel in the Australian public service virtually at will (Spry, 
2000:11; Public Service Act 1999: s.58). This is suggestive of a politicisation of the public 
service ERp but this notion has not been properly examined. 
 
As previously discussed in this paper, although the issue of public service politicisation has 
attracted a good deal of attention, the associated analysis has been somewhat lacking in 
terms of both definitions and serious scrutiny. The focus of this paper is upon a particular 
aspect of the debate and, as argued previously, the most core and important aspect, that of 
the employment relationship itself. Utilising the insights gleaned from our examination of the 
nature of the employment relationship and that of ‘politicisation’, Weberian ideal types will be 
constructed to facilitate our further analysis. 
 A Framework for Analysis 
In developing our analytical framework, we are guided by Weber (1968), Kitay and 
Marchington (1996), Northcote and Trevelyan (1854) and by the very many writers who 
have provided taxonomies of the HRM functions. 
 
The focus of our study is upon identifying whether the employment relationship of senior 
public servants is politicised. Such an enquiry virtually begs the use of Weber’s ‘ideal types’, 
as a ‘politicised’ relationship only has meaning when compared to a ‘non-politicised’ form. 
The nature of public sector employment, and the changes that have occurred within it, form 
an integral part of public sector organization and “to discuss organizations in any intellectual 
terms other than the most mundane necessarily is to draw strength from the well of Max 
Weber's intellectual legacy” (Clegg, 1990:3). The development of ‘ideal types’ requires the 
identification of the exclusive and exhaustive features of each (Kitay & Marchington, 1996). 
 
The exclusive features of the ‘rational’ (Weber, 1968:22), non-politicised, independent or 
‘open competitive’ type can be deduced from the work of Northcote and Trevelyan (1854) 
with the assistance of HRM taxonomies. Northcote and Trevelyan proposed a public 
administrative system based upon an independent agency exercising the HR function, 
appointment on merit as assessed by a proper system of examination conducted by a 
politically independent and constitutionally appointed Board, promotion based on merit and 
reports of superiors, ‘a proper system of transfers' between departments’ and annual 
increments of salary conditional upon satisfactory work (1854). These elements of an 
independent agency exercising control over the employment relationship, appointment on 
merit, access to promotion and tenure subject to satisfactory performance comprise the key 
elements of the traditional career public service in Australia (RCAGA, 1976; Spooner and 
Haidar, 2005b). Implicit within these elements is  the establishment by  the independent 
agency of a formal and impartial mechanism for assessment and review. Also, 
superannuation or a pension entitlement also contributed to the removal of patronage as well 
as ‘underpinning a permanent career structure’ (Farnham & Horton, 1996:47) 
 
In direct and extreme contrast, the exclusive features of the ‘irrational’ (Weber, 1968:22), 
dependent or politicised type can be deduced from a direct comparison with the 
characteristics of the first type: exercise of the HR function by politicians, absence of formal 
measures to assess candidates for the job, individually based remuneration (rather than a 
formalised salary scale), appointment to a position (rather than a ‘service’ and hence lack of 
guaranteed access to a career structure) and termination at the discretion of the politician. 
 
The elements of the Northcote- Trevelyan (1854) model of an independent public service 
provide the basis for developing ideal types that are ‘exclusive’, while HRM taxonomies 
assist in ensuring that the characteristics identified under each type are ‘exhaustive’. The two 
‘ideal types’ developed for analytical purposes are set out in Table 1. These two types have 
been constructed as extreme end points on a continuum. At one end we have the open- 
competitive type and, at the other, we have the politicised type. It is likely that actual cases of 
HRM practices would fall somewhere between these two extremes, in many combinations of 
the key elements. For example, although politicians may have exercised the final authority to 
employ a person for a position, they may have advertised the position nationally and based 




Table 1: Public Sector Employment Relationship Ideal Types 
 
 
HRM Functions Open-competitive Politicised 
Source of 
Authority 








All   interested   citizens   have   a 
chance   to   apply   and   receive 
consideration 
Citizens known to politicians have a 




Everyone meeting job standards 
are considered 
‘Unwanted’  persons  excluded  from 
the process 
Position Criteria Job   standards   formalised   and 
made public beforehand 
Job standards hidden and improvised 




Interview panel No formal interview process 
Relevant 
Standards 
Job related standards determine 
selection 
Standards unrelated to job determine 
selection 
Matching 
applicant to job 
Assessed through objective tests; 
i.e. qualifications, work 
experience 
Assessed through subjective criteria; 




A  board  whose  members  are 
independent of politicians 
Politicians  or  a  board  comprised  of 
members controlled by politicians 
 
Transparency 
Process is transparent and 
subject to legal challenge 
Process is ‘behind closed doors’ and 




Salary and conditions according 
to formalised scale 
Salary   and   conditions   determined 
individually - no formalised scale 
 
Motivation 
Rewards linked to formal 
requirements for promotion 
Motivational  rewards  not  linked  to 
formal career structure 
Training and 
Development 
Formally approved training 
programs linked with criteria for 
promotion 
No  formal  linkage  between  position 






Conducted by an independent 
agency with formalised 
procedures 








Subject  to  formal  performance 
requirements and review by an 
independent agency; life long or 
tenured employment 
Subject  to  politician’s  decision  and 
discretion; fixed term employment 
Retirement Formal rules apply; public funded 
pension  entitlements  specific  to 
public servants 
At discretion of politicians; no 
entitlement  to  public  funded,  public 
sector pension 
 
The ideal types set out above demonstrate characteristics that are exclusive in that there is a 
clear and measurable difference between each of those identified for each type and they are 
also exhaustive in terms of the taxonomies identified in the HRM literature. These types will 
be employed to assist an analysis of two particular cases of public sector ERps: the 




The appointment of Mr. Max Moore-Wilton to Head the Department of Prime Minister and 
Cabinet in 1996 and the dismissal of Mr. Paul Barratt from the position of Secretary of 
Defence have each been the focus of allegations of political interference in the employment 
processes (Palmer, 2006). These case studies are only explorative in terms of the model we 
have developed. It is recognized that considerably more in-depth research must be 
undertaken in order to adequately test our ideal types. However, this case study analysis will, 
it is believed, advance knowledge in this field because, as far as we are aware, a systematic 
 analysis of the HRM elements pertaining to the appointment of senior public servants has 
rarely been undertaken. 
 
Max Moore-Wilton 
Mr Max Moore-Wilton was appointed Secretary to the Department of Prime Minister and 
Cabinet from May 1996 (Mulgan, 1998b). Prior to his appointment, Mr Moore-Wilton enjoyed 
a ‘distinguished career in both the private and public sectors’ and immediately prior to 
appointment as Secretary to the Department, he was National Director, Policy Co-ordination 
and Priorities Review, Australia Stock Exchange (1995-96) (Charlton Event Solutions, 2006). 
Although he was not openly connected with the Coalition parties and had in fact been 
appointed Chief Executive of the Australian National Line by an ALP government, his 
appointment was seen as ‘political’ because he came immediately from ‘outside’ the public 
service and because  ‘his reputation for tough restructuring and down-sizing was clearly 
instrumental in his appointment and indicated that he had been chosen as the Coalition 
Government's person to spearhead retrenchment of the public service’(Mulgan, 1998b; 
Schroder, 1997). 
 
Mr. Moore-Wilton was employed under the provisions of the Public Service Act 1922 (Cwth) 
(as amended and consolidated at 6 February 1996). Under the provisions of the then Act, the 
Governor-General may appoint a person to 'an office of Secretary' on the recommendation of 
the Prime Minister. (s.36). The Act provided that the Prime Minister must not recommend an 
appointment to the Governor General unless, in the case of appointment of Secretary of 
Department Prime Minister and Cabinet, a report had been obtained from the Public Service 
Commissioner and, in the case of other Departmental Secretaries, a report was obtained 
from the Secretary to the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (s.36). The Act made 
it clear that the Governor-General must act in accordance with a recommendation made by 
the Prime Minister (s.37(11)). The Act also provided that an appointment shall not exceed five 
years (s.37) and that the Governor-General may terminate the appointment on a specified day 
and if, after that day the person does not hold another office of Secretary, he or 
she is retired from the Public Service (s.37(5)). 
Under  the  then  Act,  all  Department  Secretary’s  pay  was  set  by  the  independent 
Remuneration Tribunal (Remuneration Tribunals Act 1973). However, Mr Moore-Wilton 
allegedly approved for himself an additional tax-free accommodation allowance of $17,000 
‘because he was still technically a resident of Sydney’ (Sydney Morning Herald, 1 November 
1997). The $330 per week allowance has been estimated to be three times the level 
recommended by the public service guidelines. Mr Moore-Wilton’s salary was ‘just over 
$150,000’ but with allowances and perks, this rose to a total package of about $210,000. 
Therefore, in terms of the key factors constituting our ‘ideal types’ as set out in Table 1, it can 
be  seen that the facts of  the appointment as  far  as  they are known, point towards a 
‘politicised’ type, although there are some factors evident which do not neatly fit this type. 
 
All facts of this case are not known and, indeed, only secondary data has been identified and 
used in this paper. However, on the basis of the information available, it is possible to 
provide some tentative analysis of this case, as presented for discussion in Table 2. As can 
be seen, the information available concerning each of the key HRM functions suggests a 
tendency towards politicisation. None of the facts associated with the exercise of HRM 
functions in the Moore-Wilton case were seen to fit the ‘open-competitive’ type. However, it 
can also be seen that whilst the exercise of some functions was thought to be consistent with 
a ‘politicised’ type, many were seen to demonstrate elements of both types and thus conform 
to neither; for example, under the Act at the time of the appointment of Mr Max Moore-Wilton, 
it was the Governor-General who had the power to appoint with advice from the Prime 
Minister, who was in turn required to receive a report on the candidate from either the Public 
Service Commissioner, in the case of an appointment to Department Secretary of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) or, in the case of other Department Secretary appointments, 
from the Department Secretary of PM&C. In effect, this of course means that the Prime 




Mr  Paul  Barratt was  appointed  to  the  office  of  Secretary  to  the  Department  of 
Defence in late 1997 for a fixed-term of five (5) years commencing February 1998 
(Spry, 1999). At the time of his appointment (and latter dismissal), the provisions of 
the Public Service Act 1922 governed the appointment and the removal from office of 
Secretaries of Departments, as set out above in the previous case study. At the time 
of his appointment, Mr Barratt held office as Secretary to the Department of Primary 
Industries and Energy and he had a long history of senior appointments in the 
Australian Public Service, although interrupted by a term as the Executive Director of 
the Business Council of Australia, from 1992 to 1996. Following the election of 
October 1998, in which the Government was returned, all Secretaries of Departments 
were left in place although there was a Cabinet reshuffle and the Hon John Moore 
MP was appointed Minister for Defence (Barratt v Howard & Ors [2000] FCA 190 (10 
March 2000)). 
Table 2: Appointment of Mr Max Moore-Wilton 
 





 Governor  General-advice 
from PM-advice from 






  No public advertisement 
Opportunity to 
Apply 




  ‘Unwanted’ persons 
excluded 
Position Criteria  Dev by  politician   but 






  No formal interview process 
Relevant 
Standards 




applicant to job 
 Mixture: politicians’ 





  Politicians 
 
Transparency 




 Mixture of formal 









 Not  Known  but  thought 
not to be formally 
provided 
 














  Subject to politician’s 
decision; fixed term 
Retirement   Fixed term contract 
 
On 22 July 1999, Mr Barratt was advised by Mr Moore-Wilton, Secretary to the Department 
of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 'that his appointment would be terminated by the Governor- 
General on the advice of the Prime Minister in early August' (Australian Financial Review, 30 
July 1999:4; Spry, 1999). On 27 July 1999, Mr Barratt obtained an interim injunction from the 
Federal Court restraining the Prime Minister, Mr Howard, 'from advising the Governor- 
General to terminate Mr Barratt's employment' (The Australian, 28 July 1999:1). 
 
In a series of court cases between July and August 1999, Mr Paul Barratt  took action in the 
Federal Court against the Prime Minister, the Secretary and the Commonwealth to prevent 
the termination of his appointment (Barratt v Howard & Ors [2000] FCA 190 (10 March 
2000), ; Barratt v Howard [1999] FCA 1132, ; Barratt v Howard [1999] FCA 1183). In March 
2000, the Full Bench of the Federal Court upheld the previous decision of Justice Hely who 
had found that there was no legislative intent in the Act to exclude natural justice and that Mr 
Barratt was entitled to be told the grounds upon which a recommendation that he be 
dismissed was proposed, and to be heard. His Honour accepted that policy or political 
considerations could be factors in the decision to terminate and that, therefore, it was not 
necessary that there be a cause such as a fundamental fault on the part of the Secretary. 
The Court found that a Minister's loss of trust and confidence in a Secretary was sufficient to 
justify termination if that lack of trust and confidence was prejudicial to the effective and 
efficient administration of the department and it rejected arguments that a Secretary is 
entitled to be given reasons for the Minister's loss of trust and confidence in him or her 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2000). 
 
Although the Prime Minister may decide to recommend the dismissal of a Secretary for a 
wide range of reasons, the recommendation has 'a direct and immediate effect on the 
applicant's interests' and for this reason the obligation to provide procedural fairness arises 
(para 53). Justice Hely said that procedural fairness requires the applicant “be told the 
grounds upon which a recommendation is proposed to be made to the Governor-General 
that his appointment be terminated, and he is entitled to be heard in relation to those grounds 
or reasons” (para 68). However, the applicant need not be given an oral hearing and is only 
entitled to put his case to the Secretary of Prime Minister and Cabinet. Accordingly, Justice 
Hely argued, where the Prime Minister acts on the reasons given by his departmental 
Secretary, the Prime Minister need not also hear the applicant before making the 
recommendation to the Governor-General. However, should the Prime Minister make the 
recommendation to the Governor-General on grounds other than those contained in the 
Secretary's report, the applicant may be entitled to a further hearing (Spry, 1999). 
 
Justice Hely held that Mr Barratt, the applicant, was entitled to procedural fairness because 
he is the holder of a 'public office', that is, the 'office of Secretary', and his appointment is 
regulated by the Public Service Act (para 12). His Honour stated that “At common law, and 
apart from statute, Crown servants hold office at the pleasure of the Crown, and may be 
dismissed at any time without notice, and for any reason, or for no reason. There is no right 
to be heard before dismissal” (para 7). However, as the Public Service Act now governs the 
appointment of the applicant, the common law position no longer holds, and the applicant 
cannot be dismissed at pleasure (Spry, 1999). He may only be dismissed in accordance with 
the terms of the Act, and any exercise of a power under the Act is 'subject to general public 
 law principles which govern the exercise of administrative discretions' (para 12). The position 
of the applicant would be otherwise if his relationship with the Government were one of mere 
employee/employer. In that case, he would only be entitled to be heard before dismissal if 
the statutory contract of employment conferred such a right (para 11). 
 
To consider the issues and the judgement of the Paul Barratt case in the context of our ‘ideal 
types’, we need to focus upon the proposed features of the HRM function: Separation- 
Termination as shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Public Sector Employment Relationship Ideal Types- Separation 
 
 




Subject  to  formal  performance 
requirements and review by an 
independent agency; life long or 
tenured employment 
Subject  to  politician’s  decision 
and discretion; fixed term 
employment 
 
It would seem that the facts of the Barratt case quite clearly do not conform to the ‘open- 
competitive’ type. However, while the facts of the case more closely resemble those of the 
‘politicised’ type, there are some qualifications or differences. Paul Barrett was appointed 
under a fixed term employment contract and the judgements in the Barrett case confirmed 
the right of the Prime Minister to terminate the Department Secretary’s employment without 
there necessarily being a fault on the part of the employee. These facts are consistent with a 
‘politicised’ type. However, the Barrett judgement also found that the employee, as a holder 
of a public office, has a right to procedural fairness which requires that the person is entitled 
to be told the grounds upon which a recommendation for termination is made and is entitled 
to be heard in relation to those grounds or reasons, by the Secretary of Prime Minister and 





The focus of this paper has been upon developing an improved understanding of the 
implications of public policy for the employment relationship of senior public servants. 
It has been argued that despite the interest and importance attached to the notion of 
an ‘independent’ vis a vis ‘politicised’ public service, the meaning of politicization has 
remained imprecise. We have attempted to address this area of need by drawing on 
Weber’s ideal types and HRM taxonomies to develop a theoretical approach for 
assessing whether the employment relationship is politicised. The two case studies 
presented in the paper are based upon secondary data only and it is recognized that 
more in-depth research of the issues is needed in order to effectively test the ‘ideal 
types’ and the research approach outlined. However, by providing details of two 
exclusive and exhaustive types of HRM public sector functions, we would argue that 
we have advanced the cause of actually assessing whether or not particular public 
policies have resulted in a more politicised public service.  Although our analysis 
primarily addresses the situation of public sector employment, it has significant 
implications for understanding how public policy as well as HR practices impact upon 
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